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The four most commonly recognized systems protecting
"intellectual property" are trademark, patent, trade secret and
copyright. Trademark law is easily distinguished and offers little
opportunity for a firm to protect its work product. Thus, this paper will
address only the remaining options. Generally, sorting among them is
fairly straightforward.
Copyright
As its name implies, copyright is designed to protect its holder
against copying by others. It has a defined term for covered works such
as paintings and musical compositions. However, the protection is said
to extend to the expression of ideas not to ideas themselves.
Functionality is the enemy of copyright. If an idea can be expressed in
only one (or a few) ways, the possibility of copyright protection is
significantly weakened.
The only potential for copyright in protecting biotechnology relates
to a suggestion that DNA sequences (and I suppose amino acid
sequences) might be protected the way that software is.' Yet,
probably because copyright protects only against copying and not
against independent discovery, this suggestion appears to have gotten
lost in the rush to patent genes. It may be useful to dust it off again in
* Dr. Murashige was a founding partner of Ciotti & Murashige; the group
comprising this firm is now with Morrison & Foerster. She received her B.A.
(Chemistry) from Washington University, her Ph.D. (Chemistry) from the University
of California, Los Angeles and her J.D. from the University of Santa Clara.
1 Irving Kayton, Copyright in Living Genetically Engineered Works, 50 Geo.
Wash. L.Rev. 191 (1982).
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light of the current flurry to sequence large numbers of DNA molecules
obtained from expression libraries.
The patent application filed by the NIH claiming "expression
sequence tags" (ESTs) retrieved and sequenced by Dr. Craig Venter
and Dr. Mark Adams has received wide publicity. Inspired,
presumably, by the attempt to sequence the entire human genome, and
recognizing the fact that approximately 99% of the human genomic
DNA does not encode any proteins, Venter and Adams set about
obtaining DNA sequences by reverse transcribing the messenger RNA
found in brain cells. Because the messenger RNA embodies only genes
on their way to becoming proteins, the 99% nonsense sequences are
automatically eliminated, and the sequenced material is putatively
derived from the 1% of the genome that encodes protein (and its
associated translation regulating elements). Thus, Venter and Adams
were able to retrieve and sequence this reverse transcribed cDNA with
astonishing efficiency, and the initial NIH application contained
approximately 300 sequenced ESTs.
The number has now grown to many thousands; Drs. Venter and
Adams have left the NIH and continue their work in a private institute.
In the meantime, other companies such as Incyte Pharmaceuticals in
Palo Alto, California and a Japanese company, and probably others,
have entered the race to obtain sequences associated with the estimated
approximately 100,000 genes embedded among all the nonsense in the
human genome. The hue and cry raised by the prospect of protecting
so many DNA sequences by patent has resulted in a proposal to place a
two-year moratorium on patents related to the human genome (a
proposal that was not enacted) and in a study by the Office of
Technology Assessment on the implications of this work.
To the extent that ESTs represent copyrightable expressions, this
might prevent others from "stealing" sequencing work already done2
but would not prevent the use of independently recovered forms of the
2 The question is not only whether the subject matter is "functional," as mentioned
above, but also whether it merely comprises data. The Supreme Court recently held
that copyright does not protect data from copying, much less independent origin;
Feist v. Rural Telephone Service, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 1282 (1991).
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relevant genes and ESTs. Because copyright arises automatically upon
fixing an expression in a tangible form, whatever protection is available
already exists. 3 Aside from this possibility, however, copyright
protection as applied to biotechnology is not particularly exciting.
Patents
Although the property is said to be intangible, patent protection is
considered an asset of the patent holder. Quite often, patents are the
only assets of a young company grounded in a high technology
endeavor and requiring large R&D expenditure prior to marketing any
product at all. Therefore, obtaining an appropriate patent portfolio is an
important instrument in attracting investment and assuring investors
that when products and services are finally marketed, exclusivity will be
assured to the company.
The patent system is established in the U.S. (and in other
jurisdictions) by statute. Title 35 of the U.S. Code provides a 17-year
term during which the patentee may exclude others from making,
using or selling the claimed subject matter in the U.S. It is worth noting
that patentees may be prevented from practicing their own inventions
by patents held by others.
The 17-year monopoly is considered a quid pro quo for full
disclosure of the invention to the public. This disclosure is made
through an application filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) which is required to "contain a written description of the
invention and of the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected,
to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention."4
3 Copyright notice is no longer necessary to maintain protection in published
works, and registration is unnecessary unless one wants to bring an action. See, e.g.,
17 U.S.C. § 411.4 35 U.S.C.§ 112, 5[1.
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Applications that fail to comply with this section of the statute
cannot form the basis for the grant of a patent as defined by the claims
included in the application. The claims have to be directed to a
composition of matter, a process, a machine, or an article of
manufacture. 5 Of course, the subject matter does not have to be
claimed in those terms. It is simply to be claimed in such a way that the
claims particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention. 6 Claims of relevance in
biotechnology can be directed to proteins, DNA molecules, cells, mice,
antibodies, methods of treatment, methods of recombinant
production, oligosaccharides, oligonucleotides and so forth. They can
also be directed to assay devices, chromatographic columns, methods
to conduct electrophoresis, panels of peptides, and methods of
diagnosis. All of the foregoing are, if properly claimed, "statutory
subject matter."7
The subject matter of successful claims must meet other criteria: It
must be new, useful, and nonobvious. The novelty requirement is the
least troublesome; the claimed subject matter simply must not have
existed somewhere in the form in which it is claimed. In the context of
biotechnology, the most obvious concern is the patentability of natural
products, which, at first glance, appear to have preexisted. This is true
only up to a point, and the precedent is well established that if these
materials can be claimed in a manner which distinguishes them from
their status as they occur in nature, there is no barrier to patentability.
Early cases, prebiotech revolution, set the groundwork for this where
prostaglandins and vitamin B12 , when claimed as pure compounds,
were considered distinguishable from the gemishes in which they were
originally found. Similarly, patents have now issued on DNA encoding
erythropoietin, pure TPA, DNA encoding TPA, and so forth. There is
no longer any question that the existence of the essential features of the
5 35 U.S.C. § 101.
6 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2.
7 Not all of these are statutory subject matter in every country. Methods of
treatment, for example, are unpatentable in most jurisdictions. What will and will not
be included, as is the case with most legal provisions, is basically a political decision.
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claimed subject matter in a natural state is not a barrier to patentability
in properly constructed claims.
The Utility Requirement
Claimed inventions must be "useful". 8 There doesn't seem to be
any question that if, for example, a compound can be shown to kill
weeds, or to reduce inflammation, or to cure an infection, it is useful to
the general consuming public. It also seems clear that if a compound is
useful as a laboratory reagent, for example as a dye to detect the
presence of a protein on a chromatogram, it is useful to the research
community. It is also clear that if a compound is "useful" only to find
out what it is good for, that "utility" is not sufficient.
A related question relates to the level of proof required to
demonstrate that the utility asserted for a claimed method or
compound is in fact accurate. It is clear, in the context of applying for
patent protection, that the burden is on the examiner to show that the
asserted utility is not credible.9This burden is not particularly great,
apparently, depending on what the asserted utility is and how the PTO
chooses to treat it.
The putatively controlling case on questions of utility is Brenner v.
Manson. 10 Manson, the applicant, invented a process for making a
steroid that was a homolog of another steroid with tumor inhibiting
effects in mice. After filing, probably in response to a PTO rejection,
Manson submitted an article from the Journal of Organic Chemistry
describing the class of steroids to which the one prepared by his process
belonged. Some members of the class had antitumor activity, but the
Court held that this was inadequate to show that the steroid prepared
by the claimed process would also have such an effect. Because the
intended product was not otherwise shown to be useful, the Court held
the process to produce it wasn't useful.
8 35 U.S.C.§ 101.
9 In re Langer, 183 U.S.P.Q. 288 (CCPA 1974); In re Marzocchi, 169 U.S.P.Q.
367 (CCPA 1971).
10 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
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The Court evidently wanted to stem what it perceived as a tide
toward requiring no statement or showing of utility at all. Earlier, the
Court of Customs Patent Appeals (CCPA) had reversed a rejection, for
lack of utility, of a claim to steroid intermediates, where the steroids
that would be produced from them had no disclosed utilities.1 1 Also,
the CCPA had held in Manson that utility should be found if a
claimed process results in its intended product and its product is not
detrimental to the public interest. 12 However, the Supreme Court,
after addressing policy considerations, reversed, finally stating, "Unless
and until a process is refined and developed to this point - where
specific benefit exists in currently available form - there is insufficient
justification for permitting an applicant to engross (sic) what may prove
to be a broad field."
The implications of this decision are really quite unclear, beyond
the simple statement that, "it is insufficient to meet the utility
requirement to show that a claimed process successfully produces its
intended product when there is no specified or known use for the
intended product," the waters are murky. The case does not directly
address the standard of proof required for establishing the asserted
utility. It does hold that in the context of its facts, extrapolation from
homologous compounds is not enough. But it is totally silent as to
whether in vitro or in vivo tests are needed to establish therapeutic
utility of a steroid or other compounds. It does not address the
question of whether adequate utility would have been found had the
applicant asserted, for example, that the steroid was useful as a control
standard in a diagnostic assay for steroids in general. Perhaps if Manson
had not been misled by the trend in the CCPA away from requiring an
assertion of utility, a utility could have been asserted in his application
that would have passed muster.
It is-the element of adequate proof of therapeutic utility that causes
the most problems for applicants attempting to protect biotechnology
inventions. It is not as if the applicant does not know what kind of
11 In re Nelson, 126 U.S.P.Q. 242 (CCPA 1960).
12 In re Manson, 142 U.S.P.Q. 35 (CCPA 1964).
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therapeutic utility the invention will have. It is rather that the PTO
often demands levels of proof that are too expensive or too time
consuming for applicants to assemble prior to the application for patent
or even during the prosecution thereof. For example, in Ex parte
Balzarini, 13 the Board upheld a rejection of claims directed to a
pharmaceutical composition asserted to be effective to treat retroviral
diseases in an animal or patient. The specification only contained in
vitro tests. The Board held that these tests were not adequate proof of
in vivo efficacy.
This approach by the PTO appears quite common, especially in
claims to compositions asserted to be effective as vaccines, as antivirals,
as antitumor agents, and the like. It is not clear why this is so, since
therapeutic protocols which fail to work are applied every day in every
hospital in the country. The protocols are evidently considered useful
although manifestly they do not work, certainly not in every case or
even in a substantial number of cases. Nevertheless, the PTO has
consistently questioned assertions of such therapeutic utility - almost
invariably, if the claims themselves are directed to methods of
treatment and quite often if the therapeutic utility is the only use
disclosed for a claimed composition of matter.
The dilemma faced by an applicant seeking to develop a new
therapeutic compound is often resolved by disclosing, in addition to
the real purpose for which the invention is intended, a "safe" utility that
can be established without question. Such a "safe" utility might be that
suggested for Manson's steroid above - as a control in a quantitative
assay for steroids in general. A compound thought to be toxic to cancer
cells might be useful in a screening method for cancer cell growth
factors that overcome the effect of the toxin. A DNA molecule might
be considered useful as a reagent to prime DNA synthesis in a
controlled manner in the production of specifically binding DNA from
mixtures. Sometimes construction of these "safe" utilities works.
Sometimes the PTO won't buy it.
13 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1892 (BPAI 1992).
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For example, in Ex parte Iranz, 14 the Board itself issued a
rejection based on lack of utility to claims that were directed to a
process for making a targeted cell susceptible to lysis by a cytotoxic T-
lymphocyte. The claim itself did not require in vivo application of the
technique; the claims were worded so as to cover laboratory procedures.
But the Board said that the appellant's specification and brief "clearly
indicate that the claimed process has as its practical objective a use in
vivo specifically against cancer cells as the targets." So the Board issued
a rejection, based on asserted inadequate proof of efficacy, of a method
that was not even being claimed!
The question of patentable utility has been raised repeatedly in
connection with the multiplicity of ESTs recently sought to be patented
by the National Institutes of Health. Most are not associated with genes
encoding proteins whose functions are known. Various utilities have
been asserted including the use of the ESTs for chromosome mapping
and as probes to retrieve genes which purportedly encode proteins that
have some function since the genes are expressed in real tissues. The
issue in this context is still unresolved.
I am unaware of recent court decisions relating to proof of
therapeutic utility; but the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
has fairly consistently upheld rejections where the examiner has asserted
insufficient evidence to support a stated utility. 15 An exception is Ex
parte Rubin 16 where claims were to a method for improving the
effectiveness of interferon in the treatment of neoplastic conditions by
administering an agent for inhibiting tyrosinase. The application
provided in vitro tests which showed that tyrosinase denatured
interferon, a known antitumor agent. The Board held that the utility
described was not inherently incredible and that factual evidence was
required if the claims were to be rejected on this basis.
14 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216 (BPAI 1990).
15 See Ex parte Busse, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1908 (BPAI 1986); Ex parte Rubin, 5
U.S.P.Q.2d 1461 (BPAI 1987); Ex parte Maas, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1746 (BPAI 1987); Ex
parte Stevens, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1379 (BPAI 1990) and Ex parte Sudilovsky, 21
U.S.P.Q.2d 1702 (BPAI 1992).
16 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1461 (BPAI 1987).
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International Aspects
The economy is global, but patents are territorial. They do not
provide exclusivity beyond the borders of the jurisdiction in which
patents issue. The only arguably "long-arm" provision of the U.S.
statute relates to pure process claims. 17 Since 1988, it has been an act
of infringement to import or sell a product made by a process
protected by a U.S. patent claim. 18 One reason it was added to the
statute is that other jurisdictions have long followed this principle.
The significance of such protection for biotechnology is quite well
known. Initial attempts, using these provisions, by Amgen to. prevent
importation of erythropoietin made with their patented DNA and cells
were rebuffed. Since the claims in the Amgen patent had to do only
with the materials for manufacture of erythropoietin, and not a process
for its manufacture, they were considered not to be in a category that
permitted the exclusion of the gene product.
Although it is recognized that much time and money could be
saved with a uniform patent system at least covering the industrialized
countries, a harmonization of existing patent systems is proving
difficult, not to mention providing an independent mechanism for an
international patent. European nations have taken a first step in the
form of the European Patent Convention which went into force in 1978
and which provides a common examination and granting procedure for
its 14 member countries. However, the grant of a European patent
results only in a "bundle" of national patents which must be enforced
on a country-by-country basis. The members of the convention
intended to provide an alternative of a "community patent" in the last
year but failed to do so.
An additional step has been the implementation of a Patent
Cooperation Treaty that provides for a common application to be filed
17 There is also a type of product claim known as "product-by-process." Even before
1988, it was possible to exclude from importation such a product if made abroad by
the claimed process. See, e.g., Michael H. Dickman, Commentary: Product-by-
Process Claims in the U.S. Patent Practice, 28 Idea 59 (1987).
18 See35 U.S.C. §§ 271(g), 287(b) and 295.
5 Risk Health, Safety & Environment 119 [Spring 1994]
applicable to all member countries (which include most of the
jurisdictions important to biotechnology applicants). However, the
examination procedure conducted in connection with this international
application is nonbinding on jurisdictions in which the corresponding
patent is eventually filed.
A major hurdle in any attempts at internationalization has been U.S.
refusal to conform its patent system to those of almost all other
jurisdictions in several important respects. First, the U.S. awards the
patent to the first inventor of the claimed subject matter; everywhere
else except the Philippines it is awarded to the first to file an application
for claimed subject matter. It should be noted that in no jurisdiction is
a noninventor entitled to a patent. Copying someone else's invention
and filing the copied subject matter in the PTO is nowhere
countenanced. Second, the U.S. patent term runs from the date of
issue; everywhere else it runs from the date of filing. This has the effect
of permitting the applicant for patent to time the period of the
monopoly awarded at the patentee's convenience. Third, the U.S. keeps
applications in confidence until the patent issues; everywhere else,
applications are published eighteen months from the initial priority
filing date. This last distinction is perhaps unimportant since
participants in the global economy who file elsewhere realize that their
applications will be published regardless of what the U.S. does.
Shop Rights
A shop right issue sometimes arises in the patent context but has
nothing to do with the nature of protection afforded, the subject
matter that can be protected or criteria for protectability. It has to do
with what does and does not constitute infringement of an issued
patent - i.e., whether certain entities may or may not be among those
excluded from making, using and selling the claimed invention.
The issue arises when an employer fails to acquire ownership of the
invented subject matter from an employed inventor. It probably does
not arise with great frequency in the context of the biotechnology
industry since virtually all companies are aware of the necessity to
obtain employment agreements that require assignment of any
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inventions made in the course of employment to the employer. Various
states have statutory provisions which limit the scope of circumstances
in which such assignment can be required, but none prevents requiring
assignment where the invention was clearly made under the financial
sponsorship of the employer. It is standard practice to require such
agreements as a condition of employment and I am not aware of any
company with any kind of financing that does not require assignment
to itself of inventions made in the course of employment. If the
employer owns the invention, an issue of shop right does not arise.
In the U.S., unlike other jurisdictions, inventors must be named
applicants for patent protection. This requires that the inventors
themselves sign the oath swearing that they are the original and first
inventors of the claimed invention and that they have reviewed the
application to be submitted and understand it. This does not prevent
their assigning all their rights in the invention to their employer or
anyone else who from then on can control the prosecution of the
application to the exclusion of the inventors. The assignee cannot only
control prosecution, but can further assign the invention to anyone and
can disclaim all or a portion of it. Once the inventors have assigned the
invention, their control over it is lost.
Even absent a written agreement that employees' inventions will be
assigned to their employers, an obligation may be implied if they were
actually hired to invent. This is a judicially created rule, and it appears
to be most clearly applicable when the employee was specifically hired
to invent what he did indeed invent. 19 This decision has been followed
by many lower federal courts. It is less certain that the employer is
entitled to assignment if the employee is simply generically hired to do
research. 20 Several factors affect the decision, but should it be held
that the employer is entitled to assignment based on the "employed to
invent" principle, the issue of shop right doesn't arise either.
The shop right issue arises only when the employee retains
ownership of a patent to an invention made, at least at some level, at the
19 Standard Parts Company v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52 (1924).
20 De Jur-Amsco Corp. v. Fogle, 109 USPQ263 (3d Cir. 1956).
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employer's expense. Under those circumstances, the employer is
considered to have a shop right - i.e. a nonexclusive, royalty-free and
nontransferable license to make and use the invention without
infringing the patent. The meanings of nonexclusive, nontransferable
and royalty-free are fairly clear; however, the total scope of this license
is not. Clearly it extends to conducting business as usual by the
employer; however, whether it will extend to business successors or
expansion of the original business scope is unclear.
Trade Secrets
Trade secrets are generally protected by a mix of state statutory
and judicial provisions. They comprise information that relates to the
business of the trade secret holder and has been properly secured by
guarding against unauthorized disclosure. There is no administrative
system for obtaining protection, and it extends indefinitely, i.e. until
the secret is out. In a sense, trade secret protection is the converse of
patent protection; patents require full and complete disclosure of
protected subject matter.
Much trade secret protection important in biotechnology is similar
to that ascribable to any commercial enterprise - future business plans,
future research plans, expansion or building plans, financial records and
the like - having to do with the way a firm intends to conduct
business, is conducting business or has conducted business. This type of
trade secret may not be available to nontrade institutions such as
universities and research foundations. 'While there appears to be no law
directly on point, it may very well be that with the increased tendency
of such institutions to participate in commercial development through
outlicensing programs, and even equity investments in commercial
enterprises, this distinction may no longer be viable.
A different type of subject matter which is also susceptible to trade
secret protection overlaps that for which patent protection may be
obtained. This includes ways to produce products, ways to conduct
assays, particular materials useful in manufacture and even the
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composition of materials that are to be sold. Protection for such things
will work, of course, only if they cannot be reverse engineered (the
composition discovered from analysis of products acquired in the
marketplace).
The ability of its holder to keep a secret secret is the ultimate
requirement. The holder is not protected against discovery of the trade
secret because of inadequate schemes for insuring secrecy. Thus, with
respect, it is necessary to initiate and maintain institutional practices
which may or may not be acceptable to affected parties, such as
requiring employees to sign confidentiality agreements, requiring
visitors to wear badges and be escorted, requiring exit interviews for
employees leaving the company, requiring identification of what is and
what is not under trade secret protection and other burdensome and
rather ill-defined measures to assure confidentiality.
Universities or research institutions are -reluctant to institute
measures which seem to contradict their presumed duty to spread
knowledge. For example, even when patents are obtained, they rarely
disclose every bit of knowledge needed to practice them. Thus, patents
are often licensed with such "knowhow." Yet, restricting the availability
of knowhow in the context of a license to a commercial enterprise may
be offensive, since university researchers may feel obligated to teach the
general public what they learn.
The propensity of all participants in the biotechnology industry,
academic or not, to take a dim view of anything that inhibits
communication with colleagues is also well known. This may diminish
as industry continues to distance itself from academic environments
and increases its associations with traditional pharmaceutical companies.
As this occurs, the tendency of personnel involved in R&D to treat
their knowledge as common property will lessen.
Patents versus Trade Secrets
Finally, patents and trade secrets should be compared. Because
trade secrets do not protect against independent discovery, trying to
preserve biotechnology trade secrets seems to have elevated risk factors.
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Trade secret protection seems most appropriate for subject matter that
is unlikely to be discovered by anyone else because it is so specific to a
particular process or product that it is unlikely that a duplicate set of
experiments will be conducted. Thus, it is quite inappropriate for a
generic improvement that is likely to be stumbled upon by others in the
field. For example, if, in the production of a particular recombinant
protein, it is found that a particular fusion partner permits very high
expression in a particular host organism (and the fusion partner is
cleaved before the product is marketed), it may very well be that the
probability of discovery by competitors is quite low. If so, trade secret
protection will be fine. Yet, if it is found that a particular type of cell is
extremely effective in providing large product yields for recombinant
products in general, it is probably a mistake to attempt to keep it as a
secret. Chances for independent discovery are great and, should
independent discoverers decide to obtain a patent themselves, the trade
secret holder might have to stop using its "secret" to avoid infringing
their patent.
In general, then, trade secret protection for subject matter that
could otherwise be patented is possible only when commercialization of
the product or process or service does not automatically reveal the trade
secret. It is most appropriate when the likelihood of independent
discovery is vanishingly small. As that likelihood increases, a firm runs
an increasing risk of not only losing its trade secret protection, but also
being prevented from practicing what used to be its secret by another's
patent claiming the same territory.
